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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000577

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

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TAGS: [OVIP](#) [NEGROPONTE](#) [JOHN](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [PINR](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#)

AU-1, SU

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY,S MEETING WITH AU AMB IBOK

REF: A. KHARTOUM 574

[1](#)B. KHARTOUM 575

[1](#)C. KHARTOUM 576

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Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: On April 13, Deputy Secretary Negroponte met with Ambassador Sam Ibok, African Union (AU) Head of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) Implementation Team. Ibok explained that the rebel groups outside the DPA will remain divided but might accept a shared position if the international community developed one for them. On the AU/UN hybrid force, Ibok explained that the AU and the UN do not have a common understanding of the force composition and structure, and the Government of Sudan is using this as an excuse not to accept UN peacekeepers. He said the AU and African governments do not have the same definition of command and control as the UN. Ibok suggested a new UN Security Council Resolution to define the mandate of the hybrid force and spells out the command and control structures. End summary.

DPA Weak, but Not Lost

[1](#)2. (C) The Deputy Secretary began by asking Ibok for an update on DPA implementation. The agreement is weak, Ibok explained, because it excluded civil society and internally displaced persons (IDPs), was never properly implemented-- even by the AU-- and did not give Minni Minawi, Senior Assistant to the President and leader of the Sudanese Liberation Movement, real influence as the sole signatory. However, he said it was a good framework and would work if more rebel groups accepted it through modifications to meet their demands. These demands include compensation, political representation, a unified Darfur region, and disarmament of the Janjaweed.

[1](#)3. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed concern about reports that the Janajweed are not being disarmed but are being integrated into government forces. Ibok said that while these integrated Janajweed still engage in attacks, they are easier to monitor and hold accountable once they are incorporated into government ranks.

¶4. (C) On AU/UN mediation, Ibok believes the process is stalled and the rebels are unlikely to unify. As an alternative, Ibok recommended developing a position paper for the rebels and engaging the groups individually to accept the paper as a common negotiation agenda. Fighting must stop before a new negotiation can begin, and civil society and IDPs must become engaged. Ibok also pointed out that the only rebel group to sign the DPA, Minawi's faction, needs logistical support to stay viable.

AU and UN Not on Same Page

¶5. (C) The Deputy Secretary emphasized that the UN must have effective command and control of the hybrid mission. Ibok explained that the UN and AU have different definitions of command and control, which is creating a divide. The Government of Sudan is fostering this split and using it as an excuse not to accept the hybrid force. This is exacerbated by the fact that both the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) are weak and their top posts remain vacant. He believes the Sudanese will relent if the UN and AU can present a unified front.

¶6. (C) Ibok suggested the AU and UN immediately appoint a Joint Special Representative (JSR) to give a single message to the Sudanese and provide leadership for establishing the mission. The mandate for the JSR must be clearly separated from UNMIS and the south.

¶7. (C) The Deputy Secretary underlined that the hybrid force is a transition to a UN-led operation and the end of AMIS. Ibok responded that African leaders, especially members of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) must understand this.

¶8. (C) Finally, Ibok explained, a new UN Security Council

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Resolution (UNSCR) is needed to establish the hybrid mandate, define command and control requirements, and create a financing mechanism for the force. He believes this resolution could also be a face-saving way for the Government of Sudan to accept the force, as they still reject UNSCR 1706. The Deputy Secretary replied that he understood the problems the Sudanese had with UNSCR 1706, especially in the latter parts of paragraph 8, but the Chapter VII sections must stand.

¶9. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
Jendayi E. Frazer, A/S for African Affairs
Cameron Hume, Charge d'Affairs
Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security Council
Michael Honigstein (Embassy Notetaker)

AU
Ambassador Sam Ibok, AU Head of Darfur Peace Implementation
Ambassador Bou Bou Niang, AU Deputy Head of Darfur Peace Implementation
HUME